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Courts have traditionally opened their doors for a wide variety of 
Earthlings to adjudicate a broad range of disputes.1  However, ironically, it 
can be difficult for plaintiffs with an interest in the Earth itself to 
demonstrate that they have standing to bring their otherwise justiciable 
claim.2  This difficulty is caused in part by the requirement that a plaintiff 
make a showing of personal injury to have standing to sue.3  Even for 
environmental advocacy organizations whose explicit goal is to protect 
natural resources, unless a member of the organization can show the 
requisite pecuniary, aesthetic, or educational harm, the organization does 
not have standing to litigate destruction of the environment.4 
The result in cases denying standing for such plaintiffs is flawed 
because it is based on an understanding of environmental injuries that does 
not correspond to reality.5  One scientific theory illuminates the inadequacy 
of the judiciary’s myopic approach to standing.6  Under Gaia theory, the 
Earth is functionally a single entity more akin to a unified organism than to 
 
* J.D. (2020), Washington University School of Law. I am grateful to Evan B. Smith for the 
conversation over soup beans that irretrievably planted the idea for this project in my mind, and for all 
the subsequent encouragement. I also wish to thank Professors Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff and Maxine 
Lipeles for indispensable guidance and wisdom during the drafting process. In addition to the staff of 
the Journal, I am indebted to Hopey Fink and Perrin Bailey for editing and feedback. Special thanks 
goes to Jessica Shelton, whose love, patience, and keen insight made this possible. I must also extend 
my sincerest apologies to the St. Louis Public Library for keeping their books so long overdue. 
1.  See generally Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 742–43 (1972) (discussing the legal 
rights afforded to ships and corporations).   
2.  See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504. U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
3.  See id. at 560–61. 
4.  See id. at 563. 
5.  See infra Part II. 
6.  See generally JAMES LOVELOCK, GAIA: A NEW LOOK AT LIFE ON EARTH (1979). 












a collection of discrete ecosystems and individuals.7 This “organism” is 
known as Gaia. Human beings, and by extension the environmental 
advocacy organizations they form, are composed of no other substance but 
the Earth and are entirely dependent on the effective functioning of the Earth 
to sustain their lives.8 Logic, coupled with a heightened understanding of 
the consequences of environmental degradation in the post-industrial era, 
reveals that significant injury to any part of a whole will inevitably harm 
other parts of the whole, including humans.9  
A proper understanding of environmental injury and Gaia theory would 
allow for a more inclusive, honest approach to standing in environmental 
litigation.10  A way to accomplish this is by recognizing environmental 
plaintiffs’ standing based on their relationship to the nonhuman entity 
Gaia—in short, Gaia standing.11 
In Part I of this note, Section I.A discusses the confused and meandering 
development of standing doctrine, particularly as it relates to environmental 
plaintiffs. Section I.B examines Gaia theory, its predecessors, and its 
relationship to developments in science and culture. Then, Part II 
synthesizes the modern understanding of Earth as an interconnected entity 
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of constitutional standing 
requirements, and argues for Gaia standing, a theory of standing that honors 




A. Pure Speculation and Fantasy 
 
Article III of the Constitution confers the federal judicial power to hear 
“cases” and “controversies” in certain subject matters.12  Standing, now 
understood as a threshold requirement for a plaintiff to have a claim heard 
 
7.  James Lovelock, Geophysiology—The Science of Gaia, in SCIENTISTS ON GAIA 3 (Stephen 
H Schneider & Penelope J. Boston eds., 1991). 
8.  ROSEMARY RADFORD RUETHER, GOD AND GAIA: AN ECOFEMINIST THEOLOGY OF EARTH 
HEALING (1992). 
9.  Wendell Berry, It All Turns on Affection, in IT ALL TURNS ON AFFECTION: THE JEFFERSON 
LECTURE & OTHER ESSAYS 9, 18 (2012). 
10.  See infra Part II. 
11.  Id. 









2020]                          An Argument for Gaia Standing                           277 
 
 
in federal court, emerged in the Court’s jurisprudence staking out the 
contours of the disputes that are considered cases or controversies under 
Article III.13  According to the Court, to have standing, a plaintiff must show 
that they satisfy three “constitutional” elements, and even so, a federal court 
may decline to hear the case based on “prudential” factors.14  The 
constitutional elements of standing have come to signify the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” required to satisfy Article III,15 while the 
prudential elements are viewed as more flexible limits, which Congress can 
override, on the kinds of disputes the judiciary can entertain.16  
The so-called constitutional elements of standing are (1) injury in fact, 
which is “an invasion of a judicially cognizable interest which is (a) 
concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,” (2) causation, and 
(3) redressability.17   
The prudential factors used to assess standing are traditionally 
understood to be (1) the prohibition on asserting the rights of third parties,18 
(2) the prohibition against generalized grievances,19 and (3) that the 
plaintiff be within the statute’s intended zone of interest.20 
Justice Antonin Scalia, whose philosophy and opinions are central to 
the thesis advanced here, considered standing a vital safeguard of the 
separation of powers.21  However, Professor Gene Nichol argued that this 
 
13.  Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992). 
14.  See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (articulating the constitutional and 
prudential elements of standing). 
15.  See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504. U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).  
16.  See generally Bennett, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). 
17.  Id. 
18.  See United Food & Commercial Workers v. Brown Grp., 517 U.S. 544, 557 (1996) 
(describing the prudential nature of the restriction on third-party standing).   
19.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (“Apart from this minimum constitutional 
mandate, this Court has recognized other limits on the class of persons who may invoke the courts' 
decisional and remedial powers. . . . [W]hen the asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in 
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant 
exercise of jurisdiction.”). 
20.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (“The question 
of standing . . . . concerns, apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, the question whether the interest 
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or 
regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.”). This requirement comes from the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018).  
21.  Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 881 (1983) (“My thesis is that the judicial doctrine of standing is a 
crucial and inseparable element of [the separation of powers] principle, whose disregard will inevitably 












view is not supported by the Constitution or caselaw, contending instead 
that standing has far more to do with ensuring a plaintiff has sufficient 
interest in litigating a matter than in the demarcation of authority between 
the federal government’s branches.22  Still others have pointed out that 
standing doctrine is used strategically to evade reaching the merits of cases 
when the interests of the parties are onerous to the political views of the 
judge.23   
Setting aside accusations of less-than-noble motives of adjudicators, 
standing doctrine is recognized as one of the most confused areas of law and 
“has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases 
decided by” the Court.24 
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion in the 1992 landmark decision Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,25 which remains the most significant recent 
development in standing jurisprudence.  There, the plaintiffs attempted to 
challenge a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior.  Section 7 of 
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires federal agencies to consult 
with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that the actions they take will not 
harm endangered species or their habitats.26  Previously, the Department of 
the Interior’s position was that Section 7 applied to actions taken by United 
States agencies in foreign nations.27  However, the Department’s new 
regulation required consultation only for actions taking place within the 
United States or on the high seas.28   
A provision of the Endangered Species Act stated that “any person may 
commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including 
the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency         
 
produce—as it has during the past few decades—an overjudicialization of the processes of self-
governance.”). 
22.  See Gene Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 
635 (1985). 
23.  As one commentator put it, “To a political scientist, standing depends on the degree of 
congruence between the political and ideological goals of the plaintiff and those of the judges who 
answer the standing question.”  See Richard J. Pierce, Standing: Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741 
(1999). 
24.  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 
464, 475 (1982). 
25.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
26.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
27.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59. 
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. . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter.”29  The 
provision allowed citizens to act like private attorneys general, functioning 
as a “mechanism for controlling unlawfully inadequate enforcement of the 
law.”30 These “citizen-suit” provisions are extremely common in 
environmental statutes; nearly every major statute provides for citizen 
standing.31  
The Court’s analysis in Lujan was limited to whether Defenders of 
Wildlife had standing to bring the action. Despite the apparent 
congressional grant of jurisdiction, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not 
satisfy the Constitution’s requirements to have their dispute heard in federal 
court.32 
The plaintiffs asserted that they had standing because the new rule 
would “increase[] the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened 
species.”33  While the Court agreed that “the desire to use or observe an 
animal species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is undeniably a 
cognizable interest for the purpose of standing,”34 it found, relying on Sierra 
Club v. Morton,35 that even though there may be an interest, “the injury in 
fact test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest.  It requires 
that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”36 The 
plaintiffs, who in their affidavits did not describe any certain plans to visit 
the areas outside of the United States that would be affected, were not able 
to convince the Court that they had an injury that was “imminent” despite 
expressing intentions to return to the areas “someday.”37 
The Court snubbed the plaintiffs’ arguments that they were injured by 
harm to endangered species under three novel theories, including the 
ecosystem nexus.38 The ecosystem nexus “proposes that any person who 
uses any part of a ‘contiguous ecosystem’ adversely affected by a funded 
 
29.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018). 
30.  Sunstein, supra note 13, at 165. 
31.  See id. at n.11.  
32.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571. 
33.  Id. at 562. 
34.  Id. at 562–63. 
35.  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
36.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35). 
37.  Id. at 564. 
38.  Id. at 565–66.  The other two theories, the animal nexus and the vocational nexus, are 
interesting in their own right but are less relevant to this paper. 












activity has standing even if the activity is located a great distance away.”39  
The Court rejected this approach, holding that it is not sufficient to be “in 
the vicinity” of an area threatened by the challenged activity and that the 
person bringing suit must be one who actually uses the area.40 According to 
the Court, “it goes beyond the limit . . . and into pure speculation and 
fantasy, to say that anyone who observes or works with an endangered 
species, anywhere in the world, is appreciably harmed by a single project 
affecting some portion of that species with which he has no more specific 
connection.”41 
In sum, the Court’s decision in Lujan requires that a plaintiff seeking 
redress of an agency’s or government’s failure to act in accordance with the 
law demonstrate some special or additional particularized harm.  Concern 
for endangered animals and their habitats is not sufficiently injurious for an 
individual to bring a claim in federal court absent some actual property or 
aesthetic interest that may be threatened.   
The “injury in fact” element of standing, so vital to the Court’s decision 
in Lujan, cannot be found in the plain text of Article III of the Constitution.42  
The phrase did not make an appearance in any Court opinion until 1970, in 
Barlow v. Collins.43  Of course, standing in general is also unmentioned in 
the Constitution.  It was first referenced as a limit to Article III judicial 
power in the 1944 case Stark v. Wickard.44  Early federal courts’ 
determinations of whether a dispute was a “case or controversy” suitable for 
adjudication were more straightforward; the inquiry concerned the existence 
of a common-law or statutorily conferred cause of action, similar to the rule 
of the English courts most familiar to the Framers.45  While standing 
doctrine has evolved dramatically since the Constitution was ratified, the 
 
39.  Id. at 565.  
40.  Id. at 565–66. 
41.  Id. at 567. 
42.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. III. 
43.  Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).  
44.  Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1944);  see also Sunstein, supra note 13, at 168–70 
(examining the infrequency of the use of the concept of standing throughout American judicial history).  
45.  Sunstein, supra note 13, at 170–73 (describing the striking similarity of the approach of early 
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Court’s decision in Lujan set an unprecedented limit on Congress’s power 
to prescribe standing for individuals in federal court.46   
There are notable exceptions to the general rules.  A state may 
sometimes sue on behalf of the welfare of its citizens under a theory of 
parens patriae for harms that threaten the state’s and its residents’ roles in 
the federal system47 or that “the State, if it could, would likely attempt to 
address through its sovereign lawmaking powers.”48  Though standing is 
understood to be jurisdictional and therefore not waivable, private citizens 
are allowed to bring a qui tam action on their own behalf and on behalf of 
the United States to enforce a federal statute—and actually be paid 
damages—even if the statute has absolutely nothing to do with the 
plaintiff.49   
From time to time, the Court also finds reasons to set aside its prudential 
concerns when it comes to standing.  One twist of the prohibition on 
asserting third-party rights is the uncontroversial acceptance of shareholder 
derivative suits.  Shareholder “[d]erivative suits are the procedural 
mechanism to enforce state fiduciary duty law.”50  In this type of litigation, 
“the corporation is the functional plaintiff—that is, the real party in 
interest—and the allegations are that the corporation's current or former 
officers and directors breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation.”51  
 
46.  See generally id. (tracing the arc of standing doctrine in five distinct phases, beginning with 
the earliest American law and concluding with the Court’s decision in Lujan). 
47.  The Court explained this standard (rather unhelpfully): 
[T]o have [parens patriae] standing the State must assert an injury to what 
has been characterized as a “quasi-sovereign” interest, which is a judicial 
construct that does not lend itself to a simple or exact definition. Its nature is 
perhaps best understood by comparing it to other kinds of interests that a State 
may pursue and then by examining those interests that have historically been 
found to fall within this category. 
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982). 
48.  Id. at 607.  
49.  See Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989) 
(“The qui tam action offers an unconventional means by which Congress may enlist the aid of private 
citizens in enforcing Federal statutory schemes.  In such an action, a private person maintains a civil 
proceeding on behalf of both herself and the United States to recover damages and/or to enforce penalties 
available under a statute prohibiting specified conduct.  The private plaintiff shares any monetary 
recovery with the United States.”); see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 
529 U.S. 765, 770–77 (2000) (Scalia, J.) (explaining that the historical significance of qui tam actions 
justifies an exception to the elements of standing as currently formulated). 
50.  Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical Analysis, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1749, 1756 (2010). 
51.  Id. 












When a shareholder wins a derivative suit, recovery is given not to the 
shareholder but is instead “returned to the corporation.”52  The right to bring 
these suits belongs even to an owner who has just one share.  
These examples, while perhaps not upending the standing formula 
entirely, demonstrate that the judiciary’s approach to standing can be pliable 
in response to the problem before it.  Among the many criticisms of Justice 
Scalia’s approach in environmental cases is that it is blatantly “insensitiv[e] 
to the holistic nature of environmental injuries.”53  Other commentators 
have pointed out that, as insistent as he is that they are “value neutral,” 
Scalia’s decisions, including those concerning standing, openly reflect his 
political ideology and to a great extent, his religious proclivities.54  
Some have called for adoption of a more inclusive approach for 
environmental interests.  According to Professor Christopher D. Stone, the 
Earth should be allowed to assert legal rights in court as other nonhuman 
entities have.55  Justice William Douglas advanced this view in his dissent 
in Sierra Club v. Morton:   
The critical question of “standing” would be simplified and 
also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule that 
allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate 
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads 
and bulldozers. . . . Contemporary public concern for 
protecting nature’s ecological equilibrium should lead to 
the conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue 
for their own preservation.56 
 
52.  Id.  
53.  Peter Manus, Wild Bill Douglas’s Last Stand: A Retrospective on the First Supreme Court 
Environmentalist, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 111, 136 (1999). 
54.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 385, 391 (2000) (“Is it mere coincidence that in virtually every case Justice Scalia discerns 
from the Constitution the conclusion [that] is consistent with his conservative personal ideology?”);  see 
also Don Ellinghausen, Jr., “In Standing Is the Preservation of His World”: Justice Scalia and the 
Varieties of Natural-Religious Experience, 16 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 474 (2009) (discussing at 
length the religious influence Scalia revealed in his decisions). 
55.  See Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for Natural 
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972);  see also Ellinghausen, supra note 54, at 518 (discussing at 
length Professor Stone’s proposal to grant standing to the environment). 
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The idea of granting standing in federal court to a nonhuman entity may 
at first glance seem bizarre or unlikely, but it is in fact routine to the point 
of mundane.  As Justice Douglas pointed out, ships and corporations can be 
parties in litigation, and he argued that natural features, through a guardian, 
should be allowed to be parties as well.57 
The Court has never adopted the dissent’s approach in Sierra Club.  
However, a recent case indicates that broad environmental interests such as 
those the Sierra Club sought to protect may still have a place in federal court.  
In Juliana v. United States, the Oregon District Court held that a group of 
young people and others challenging the federal government’s climate 
change policy had standing to sue.58  The Oregon District Court found that 
the injuries alleged based on damage to their family properties, personal 
health, or recreational opportunities were cognizable.59  While this decision 
does not go as far as Justice Douglas or Professor Stone may have preferred 
in terms of giving legal recognition to natural objects, it does show that the 
concept of injury may be flexible in response to the grave risks posed by 
environmental catastrophe and climate change.  
 
B. A Tough Bitch 
 
Two decades before Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, a short book brought a concept into mainstream 
awareness that had been quietly simmering in academic journals for a few 
years.  James Lovelock’s Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth advanced a 
new perspective on the role of biota (living organisms) and abiota 
(nonliving factors) in the maintenance of a habitable planet.60  It argued that 
the planet functions like a living being, appearing to self-regulate, because 
of the interaction of specific mechanisms such as temperature, atmospheric 
composition, and carbon-based lifeforms.61  Lovelock named his idea—and 
the entity it described—Gaia.62 
 
57.  Id. at 742–43.  
58.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242 (D. Or. 2016). 
59.  Id. at 1244.   
60.  See generally LOVELOCK, supra note 6. 
61.  Id.  
62.  Scientists and others who write about this topic variably use “Gaia theory” and “Gaia 
hypothesis” when referring to the basic framework proposed by Lovelock and refined by others.  For 












According to Lovelock, understanding this unifying concept of the 
planet requires a holistic, interdisciplinary approach that had been lacking 
since the early nineteenth century.63  He blamed the Victorian-era “divorce 
of the earth and life sciences” for obscuring the emergent properties of 
Earth, “that is, [that] the whole will be more than the sum of the parts.”64  
He explained:  
When biochemists examine a live animal, they know that 
many of its reactions and processes can be adequately 
described by simple deterministic physics and chemistry.  
But they also accept the legitimacy of physiology.  They 
know that for an intact animal, homeostasis, the automatic 
regulation of temperature, and chemical composition, 
although it involves chemistry, are emergent properties.  
Such properties require physiology for their explanation 
and understanding.  I think the same can be said of the 
earth.  If it is a superorganism, then explaining its reactions 
and processes requires physiology as well as chemistry and 
physics.65 
Conceiving of the Earth as a single living entity, even an organism, was 
not entirely novel even in the 1970s.  Sir Isaac Newton wrote in the 
seventeenth century that “this Earth resembles a great animall or rather 
inanimate vegetable, draws in aethereall breath for its daily refreshment & 
vitall ferment & transpires again with gross exhalations.”66  In a lecture 
before the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 1785, James Hutton, the father of 
biology, said, “I consider the Earth to be a superorganism and that its proper 
study should be by physiology.”67   
 
the sake of simplicity in the limited scope of this paper, the term “Gaia” will be used to refer to both the 
theory and the entity. 
63.  Lovelock, supra note 7; see also Lynn Margulis & Gregory Hinkle, The Biota and Gaia: 
150 Years of Support for Environmental Sciences, in SCIENTISTS ON GAIA 11, 15 (Stephen H. Schneider 
& Penelope J. Boston eds., 1991) (“The study of Gaia intrinsically involves disciplines as disparate as 
atmospheric chemistry and microbial physiology. . . . Without such interdisciplinary activities, most 
Gaian phenomena will remain unstudied.”).    
64.  Lovelock, supra note 7. 
65.  Id. at 4–5.  
66.  GORDON FISHER, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE OF ASTRONOMY AND ASTROLOGY: A HISTORY 
OF ASTRAL PREDICTION FROM ANTIQUITY TO NEWTON 188 (2006) (quoting Newton’s 1670s manuscript 
“Of nature’s obvious laws and processes in vegetation”).  









2020]                          An Argument for Gaia Standing                           285 
 
 
However, the publication of Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species 
in 1859 signaled a paradigmatic shift.68  The frame for analysis in biology 
became evolution by adaptation, a model that focused on life-form 
speciation through generational response to the environment.69  Biologists 
began to study how beings are shaped by their habitat and competition while 
ignoring the subtler point, that the habitat is likewise altered by its beings.  
The study of ecology continued throughout the twentieth century 
disregarding the advice of scientist Alfred Lotka to “constantly take in view 
the evolution, as a whole, of the system (organism plus environment)” and 
neglecting his insight that “[i]t is not so much the organism or the species 
that evolves, but the entire system, species plus environment.  The two are 
inseparable.”70 
The famed Russian geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky wrote boldly of the 
proper understanding of the relationship between humanity and the Earth.  
He complained that his contemporaries had “consciously failed to reckon 
with the natural laws of the biosphere, the only terrestrial envelope where 
life can exist,” and went on to say of the biosphere,   
Basically man cannot be separated from it; it is only now 
that this indissolubility begins to appear clearly and in 
precise terms before us.  He is geologically connected with 
its material and energetic structure.  Actually no living 
organism exists on earth in a state of freedom.  All 
organisms are connected indissolubly and uninterruptedly, 
first of all through nutrition and respiration, with the 
circumambient material and energetic medium.  Outside it 
they cannot exist in a natural condition.71 
Lovelock illustrates this concept in his famous Daisyworld model using 
a single variable—temperature—to demonstrate how living beings 
influence and shape the environment.72  Daisyworld supposes an imaginary 
planet with a limited atmosphere, plenty of land, steady output from the sun, 
and ample water that is well-seeded with daisies of two shades, light and 
 
68.  Id. at 4.   
69.  Id.   
70.  ALFRED J. LOTKA, ELEMENTS OF PHYSICAL BIOLOGY 16 n.19 (Williams and Wilkins Co. 
1925).  
71.  Vladimir I. Vernadsky, The Biosphere and the Noösphere, 33 AM. SCIENTIST 4 (George 
Vernadsky trans., 1945). 
72. Lovelock, supra note 7, at 5–7.   












dark.73  Temperature is controlled primarily by the albedo, or reflectivity, of 
the planet’s surface.74  The daisies grow best at a temperature of 22.5 
degrees Celsius but can germinate and live at temperatures above five 
degrees and below forty degrees.75  At first, dark daisies, absorbing more 
solar radiation due to their dark pigment and becoming warmer than the 
planet’s surface, vastly outperform light daisies, which reflect light and are 
cooler than the planet’s surface.76  However, over time, dark daisies’ 
proliferation increases the planet’s average temperature until it exceeds the 
ideal 22.5 degrees, causing them to face stiffer competition from light 
daisies that maintain a lower temperature.77  As the light daisy population 
burgeons, the planet cools until it is below 22.5 degrees again, giving the 
advantage back to the dark daisies.78  This process continues through 
successive generations until fluctuation is minimal and the optimal 
population of light and dark daisies is stable, along with the planet’s 
temperature.79 
Lovelock and others applied the Daisyworld concept to computer 
models to demonstrate how living organisms interact on a global scale with 
an abiotic factor.80  He developed models that included ten different-colored 
daisies, and further complicated the system by adding in factors such as 
rabbits and foxes.81  In doing so he demonstrated “the remarkable 
mathematical stability of geophysiological models”82 and gave support to 
his conjecture that “life is a planetary-scale phenomenon” and that evolution 
of the species and evolution of the environment are “tightly coupled as a 
single indivisible process.”83 
Among the difficulties recognized by critics of Gaia is that its 
development in scientific literature has been marked by a distinct lack of 
 
73.  Id. 
74.  Id. at 5. 
75.  Id. at 6. 
76.  Id. at 5–7. 
77.  Id. 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
80.  Id. at 6–8. 
81.  Id. at 7–8.  
82.  Id. at 9. 
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precision in defining of what, exactly, it purports.84  James Lovelock himself 
has characterized and described his ideas using various terms over the years, 
often defining and redefining his points in response to criticism and 
continuing research.85   
Even those responsible for the concept’s early development have 
similarly presented alternate formulations and at times openly disagreed 
with Lovelock.  Lynn Margulis, the renowned scientist best known for her 
innovations in the understanding of symbiosis in cell biology, as well as a 
vital figure in the initial conception of Gaia, wrote in her essay “Gaia is a 
Tough Bitch,” 
Lovelock would say that Earth is an organism. I disagree 
with this phraseology. No organism eats its own waste. I 
prefer to say that Earth is an ecosystem, one continuous 
enormous ecosystem composed of many component 
ecosystems. Lovelock’s position is to let the people believe 
that Earth is an organism, because if they think it is just a 
pile of rocks they kick it, ignore it, and mistreat it.  If they 
think Earth is an organism, they'll tend to treat it with 
respect.  To me, this is a helpful cop-out, not science. Yet I 
do agree with Lovelock when he claims that most of the 
things scientists do are not science either. And I realize that 
by taking the stance he does he is more effective than I am 
in communicating Gaian ideas.86   
One of Gaia’s most outspoken critics, James W. Kirchner, offered a 
helpful spectrum to examine the various ideas that have developed under 
the name of Gaia theory.87  He stratified the various understandings of Gaia 
along a five-layer continuum from “weak” to “strong” to indicate the 
“extremity” of each of the contentions.88  The weakest, least controversial 
Gaia hypothesis identified by Kirchner is that “the biota has a substantial 
 
84.  “Gaia is a not a hard-and-fast, well-defined concept.  It is not a ‘set menu.’  Rather it is more 
like a loosely defined smörgåsbord, from which ‘diners’ can take their pick from a collection of several 
related hypotheses, often couched in rather vague terms.”  TOBY TYRELL, ON GAIA: A CRITICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIFE AND EARTH 4 (2013).  
85.  Id. at 4–5. 
86.  Lynn Margulis, Gaia Is a Tough Bitch, in THE THIRD CULTURE: BEYOND THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION 140 (John Brockman ed., 1995). 
87.  James W. Kirchner, The Gaia Hypotheses: Are They Testable? Are They Useful?, in 
SCIENTISTS ON GAIA 38 (Stephen H. Schneider & Penelope J. Boston eds., 1991). 
88.  Id. 












influence over certain aspects of the abiotic world, such as the temperature 
and composition of the atmosphere.”89  The strongest, most controversial 
contention ever advanced concerning Gaia is that “the biota manipulates its 
physical environment for the purpose of creating biologically favorable, or 
even optimal, conditions for itself.”90 
Despite differences among individual scientists, some tenets of the 
concept remain common across multiple descriptions of Gaia hypotheses.91  
The theory has inspired decades of scientific inquiry to test specific Gaian 
mechanisms92 and catalyzed the development of an entirely new discipline, 
Earth system science, that can be studied for undergraduate and graduate 
degrees offered at universities such as Stanford93 and the University of 
California at Irvine.94 
While it is by no means unanimous, support for Lovelock and 
Margulis’s thesis has grown tremendously in the scientific community since 
it was first introduced.95  As one editorial writer put it, “[Gaia theory] made 
Lovelock . . . a hero not just to the public but also to his fellow scientists.  
The Gaia theory has gone from heresy to near-orthodoxy in less than four 
decades and now informs a series of international research programmes.”96 
 
89.  Id. at 38–39. 
90.  Id. Lovelock later disavowed the two strongest forms of Gaia described by Kirchner, 
“Teleological” (purposive) and “Optimizing Gaia.”  He no longer abides the notion that the mechanisms 
of Gaia’s systems function with intent to make the Earth habitable for life nor that Gaia optimizes the 
environment for life.  See TYRELL, supra note 84, at 5. 
91.  TYRELL, supra note 84, at 4.  Toby Tyrell’s book carefully examines the evidence supporting 
three major assertions that are central to the Gaian thesis.  Id.  First, that “Earth is a favorable habitat for 
life.”  Id.  Second, “it has been so over geologic time as the environment has remained fairly stable.”  Id.  
Third, that the stability of the environment “is partly due to life’s role in shaping the environment.  For 
instance, life has influenced the chemical composition of the atmosphere and the sea.”  Id.   
92.  See, e.g. Robert J. Charlson, James E. Lovelock, Meinrat O. Andreae & Stephen G. Warren, 
Oceanic Phytoplankton, Atmospheric Sulphur, Cloud Albedo and Climate, 326 NATURE 655 (1987) 
(discussing the results of a study of emissions of dimethylsulphide from planktonic algae on climate 
regulation).   
93.  STANFORD EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE, https://pangea.stanford.edu/ess 
[https://perma.cc/P8GF-A3U4]. 
94.  UCI DEPARTMENT OF EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE, https://www.ess.uci.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/D8NF-KT5F].   
95.  Editorial, Earth System Science: From Heresy to Orthodoxy, GUARDIAN (Jul. 26, 2009), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jul/27/climate-change-gaia-theory 
[https://perma.cc/3XT4-U7TH]. 
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Further illustrating this point, in 2001, over a thousand scientists signed 
a declaration at a worldwide conference in Amsterdam stating, “The Earth 
System behaves as a single, self-regulating system comprised of physical, 
chemical, biological and human components.”97  Toby Tyrell, a critic of 
Gaia, pointed out that this “wording almost could have been lifted from one 
of Lovelock’s books” and acknowledged “the scientific respectability and 
the continuing prominence” of the theory in the scientific community.98  
Suffice it to say, Gaia is by no means a fringe concept and plays an 
important, even central, part in ongoing research of the Earth. 
To those outside of scientific academia who have picked up on the 
notion, Gaia represents not only a model to map the large-scale interaction 
of abiotic and biotic elements but also a powerful method of interpreting 
theology, morality, and ethics.  For example, in her book God and Gaia, 
theology professor Rosemary Radford Ruether utilizes Gaia to inform her 
thesis of justice and humanity’s relationship to the rest of nature.99  
Professor Ruether, describing Gaia as a “living organism of complex 
interdependencies and biofeedback, linking biota and its ‘environment’ of 
soil, air, and water,” points out the “falsity of the human concept of 
‘competition’” that “imagines the other side as an ‘enemy’ to be 
‘annihilated,’ rather than an essential component of an interrelationship 
upon which it itself interdepends.”100  She calls for human ethics to mirror 
this “natural interdependency” in increased compassion and cooperation 
with other “members of the biotic community upon which we depend for 
our own life.”101 
Gaia implicates a distinctly non-anthropocentric worldview.102  This 
perspective, that human beings are not the most important or central element 
 
97.  See TYRELL, supra note 84, at 3 (emphasizing the significance of this statement as reflective 
of the legitimacy of Gaia theory).  
98.  TYRELL, supra note 84, at 3. 
99.  RUETHER, supra note 8.  
100.  Id. at 56. 
101.  Id. at 57.  
102.  “The Gaia hypothesis is a biological idea, but it’s not human-centered.  Those who want 
Gaia to be an Earth goddess for a cuddly, furry human environment find no solace in it.  They tend to 
be critical or to misunderstand.” Margulis, supra note 86;  see also Thomas J. Donahue, 
Anthropocentrism and the Argument from Gaia Theory, ETHICS & ENV’T, Fall 2010, at 51, 72 
(explaining after thoroughly contending with a list of twelve premises of Gaia, “it appears that the truth 
of Gaia theory would make it more probable than not that anthropocentrism is false[, s]o accepting Gaia 
theory would give you a strong reason for rejecting anthropocentrism”).    












of existence, may be read as incompatible with the capitalistic neoliberal 
attitude of the West.103  However, it is not out of step with philosophies 
found in world religions.  For example, the Earth-human relationship 
understood by Buddhist writers and thinkers reflects a recognition of the 
inherent moral value of nature and rejects the view that human beings are 
superior to other living beings.104  This attitude rejects anthropocentrism and 
calls for a restoration of harmony among beings, not unlike the Gaian 
concept of homeostasis.105   
Other philosophies not specifically associated with a particular religion 
also accord well with the scientific model of Gaia.  For example, Norwegian 
philosopher Arne Naess developed the concept of “deep ecology,” which he 
described as the component in ethics and religion that required people to 
“valu[e] nature for its own sake.”106  Gaia’s emphasis on the inextricable 
connection of humans to the natural world lends itself easily to this 
perspective. 
This idea is also found in art and philosophy in North America. 
Kentucky farmer and author Wendell Berry wrote in his essay “It All Turns 
on Affection,” 
Industrialists and industrial economists have assumed, with 
permission from the rest of us, that land and people can be 
divorced without harm. . . . But land abuse cannot brighten 
the human prospect.  There is in fact no distinction between 
the fate of the land and the fate of the people.  When one is 
abused, the other suffers.  The penalties may come quickly 
to a farmer who destroys perennial cover on a sloping field.  
They will come sooner or later to a land-destroying 
civilization such as ours.”107 
Famed forester and environmental writer Aldo Leopold described in his 
essay “Thinking Like a Mountain” the importance of considering the 
consequences to the broader ecosystem before taking an action that may 
 
103.  See generally Judith E. Koons, Earth Jurisprudence: The Moral Value of Nature, 15 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 263 (2008). 
104.  See generally Ellinghausen, supra note 54, at 496–507 (quoting from the teachings of the 
Dalai Lama and other noted Buddhist writers).  
105.  Id. 
106.  David L. Barnhill & Roger S. Gottlieb, Introduction to DEEP ECOLOGY & WORLD 
RELIGIONS: NEW ESSAYS ON SACRED GROUNDS 1 (Barnhill & Gottlieb, eds., 2001). 
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upset the natural balance requisite to its continued viability—in that 
instance, killing wolves so that theoretically there may be more deer.108  
Leopold also wrote of the importance of acting with an eye toward what he 
called a “land ethic,” stating, “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.”109   
It is clear from such examples that a holistic view of the relationship 
between humanity and nature is not unusual.  Gaia, while basically a 
scientific idea, unifies themes of interdependence also seen in theology, 
philosophy, ethics, and art.   
Theories in science are not meant to be proven true or false, but rather 
are subject to iterative research and testing to show whether they are 
supported or unsupported by subsequent results.  The theory of Gaia, 
however, rings “true” across disciplines and informs a wide range of ideas.  
This thesis of interconnectedness may prove incredibly useful in inspiring 
fundamental change to the human way of being, as time is running out to 
forge a path away from destruction.110 
 
II. ANALYSIS: THE UNFORECLOSED POSSIBILITY 
 
I am not willing to foreclose the possibility [ ] that in different 
circumstances a nexus theory similar to those proffered [in Lujan] might 
support a claim to standing. 
—Justice Anthony Kennedy111 
 
As others have pointed out, a major flaw of Justice Scalia’s attitude 
toward plaintiffs in environmental cases is that it ignores the “holistic nature 
of environmental injuries”112 and this tendency is seen clearly in his 
treatment of standing.  Scalia, writing for the majority in Lujan v. Defenders 
 
108.  ALDO LEOPOLD, Thinking Like a Mountain, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 129–33 (1949). 
109.  ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 224–25 (1949). 
110.  See Umair Irfan, Report: We Have Just 12 Years to Limit Devastating Global Warming, 
VOX, (Oct. 8, 2018, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/8/17948832/climate-change-global-
warming-un-ipcc-report [https://perma.cc/BZ8B-TGPM] (discussing the new United Nations 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report that urges drastic changes in energy and fossil fuel 
policy to mitigate some of the devastating effects of global warming).  
111.  Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
112.  See Manus, supra note 53, at 136. 












of Wildlife, flatly dismissed the plaintiffs’ “novel standing theor[y]” of an 
ecosystem nexus whereby “any person who uses any part of a ‘contiguous 
ecosystem’ adversely affected . . . has standing even if the activity is located 
a great distance away.”113  In short, Scalia’s view is that hurting part of Earth 
cannot injure someone else who is not in some way interested in the specific 
place that is being hurt. 
Perhaps Justice Scalia was not wrong in how he characterized the 
Constitution’s requirements for a plaintiff to have standing to sue in federal 
court.114 What he was most certainly wrong about is much more 
fundamental—he was wrong about what a person is.  
Gaia has obvious implications for the Court’s conception of Article III 
standing.  In general, personal injury such as is required to establish standing 
involves, tautologically, injury to a person.  The paradigmatic assumption 
in litigation that concerns the environment is that there is a dichotomy 
between “persons” and “the environment,” as if the planet we happen to live 
on is “a stage, and all the men and women merely players.”115  However, as 
Gaia illustrates, the distinction between humans and Earth is entirely 
illusory.  Human beings are part of a single, interconnected entity, and 
damage to a part is damage to the whole.  Humans have a real injury when 
the Earth is damaged not because they own it, but because they are it. 
Justice Scalia wrote that standing provides “an answer to the very first 
question that is sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of 
another's actions: ‘What's it to you?’”116  The answer to that question for 
plaintiffs bringing a claim because of damage to the Earth is, simply, 
“everything.”  The totality of a person’s interests in life, liberty, and 
property are inextricably connected to the integrity of the Earth. 
There must be a way to integrate a modern scientific understanding of 
the human-Earth relationship with standing doctrine.  I propose a new 
theory of standing called Gaia standing, which allows aggrieved persons to 
sue under such mechanisms as the citizen-suit provisions of environmental 
 
113.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565. 
114.  He could be wrong, but in this author’s opinion it is not very meaningful to be wrong about 
something that is essentially a fiction.  See Sunstein, supra note 13, at 185 (“One might well ask: What 
was the source of the injury-in-fact test? Did the Supreme Court just make it up? The answer is basically 
yes.”). 
115.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 7.   
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statutes based on the inextricable relationship between human wellbeing 
and a stable Earth system.  This type of standing should be limited to cases 
concerning environmental injury because of its uniquely holistic character.   
Standing after Lujan requires a plaintiff to show an injury that is 
concrete and particularized.117  In cases about the environment, courts 
should look no further than the injury the defendant’s purported actions 
have on Gaia.  Gaia is, after all, the entity that is really at interest in such 
cases,118 and every plaintiff, by their very existence, has a stake in the 
wellbeing of Gaia.  
Even so, when a plaintiff makes a claim based on Gaia standing, the 
grievance is not generalized.119 Environmental injury from a Gaian 
perspective affects many, but “[t]he fact that an injury may be suffered by a 
large number of people does not of itself make that injury a nonjusticiable 
generalized grievance.”120 Gaia injury is to the plaintiff because the plaintiff 
is an inextricable part of Gaia.  
Gaia standing is not a wily way of sneaking an unconstitutional plaintiff 
into court; rather, it is a way of setting right the wrongs caused by the 
judiciary’s lack of understanding of environmental injury.  Gaia standing 
does not grant “legal rights” to the environment generally.  Courts are 
decidedly human contrivances.  Accepting Gaia does not necessarily mean 
that we should open the doors to the rivers and forests, as Christopher Stone 
and Justice Douglas advocated.121  Rather, Gaia requires more properly a 
reexamination of the validity of the distinction between human beings and 
the environment.  There is no need to give standing to “the environment”; 
under Gaia, “the environment” has been in court all along in the form of 
human beings.   
 
117.  See generally Sunstein, supra note 13 (documenting the effect of the Lujan decision on 
standing doctrine).   
118.  See Stone, supra note 55, for a thorough explanation of the centrality of the natural object’s 
interests in environmental litigation. 
119.  Cf. supra note 19 and accompanying text (introducing the “generalized grievance” concept 
as a prudential restriction on standing). 
120.  Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 n.7 (2016). The Court continued, “The 
victims’ injuries from a mass tort, for example, are widely shared, to be sure, but each individual suffers 
a particularized harm.” Id.  
121.  Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing with 
approval Stone, supra note 55).   












Like the judiciary’s current approach, a “guardianship” approach as 
described by Professor Stone122 as a means of granting standing to 
nonhuman natural objects also does not comport with biological reality and 
only reinforces a paternalistic attitude toward nature that may be in part a 
source of the crisis we face today.123  There is a world of difference between 
a plaintiff stating “I am injured because I love this natural feature” and “I 
am injured because the integrity of this natural feature is directly connected 
to the wellbeing of a whole of which I am a part.”  The latter has a strong 
analogy in shareholder derivative suits wherein the shareholder is entitled 
to bring suit because they have a personal interest in the organization even 
when specific actions of specific executives cannot be traced directly to 
financial harm to the shareholder’s stock.   
The principal advantage of Gaia standing over Professor Stone’s 
guardianship approach is that Gaia standing changes nothing about the way 
courts handle environmental litigation procedurally.  For example, there is 
no inquiry into the adequacy of a “guardian” to bring a claim on behalf of a 
natural feature; with Gaia standing, plaintiffs speak for themselves.  Gaia 
standing only requires the court to see plaintiffs as they really are: 
constituents of a much greater entity, the beauty, integrity, and stability124 
of which is directly connected to plaintiffs’ own interests.   
A critic of Gaia standing may point out that minor damage to the Earth 
would not actually affect a remotely located in the manner contemplated.  
For example, while a private landowner burning large swaths of the 
rainforest to graze cattle presents an obvious problem to an interest shared 
 
122.  Stone, supra note 55, at 464 (“One ought, I think, to handle the legal problems of natural 
objects as one does the problems of legal incompetents . . . . The guardian . . . represents the incompetent 
in his legal affairs.  Courts make similar appointments when a corporation has become ‘incompetent’—
they appoint a trustee in bankruptcy or reorganization to oversee its affairs and speak for it in court when 
that becomes necessary.”). 
123.  A longer discussion of the problematic implications of a view of nature that places human 
beings in a position of authority over nature can be found in Ellinghausen, supra note 54, at 482 
(“Justice Scalia's eco-phobic mindset reflects four philosophical influences that serve to rationalize 
humankind's ‘taming’ and developing nature. These are a Cartesian paradigm, in which man alone 
possesses consciousness; a Christian theological universe, in which man must escape the snares of his 
earthbound existence to achieve salvation; an emerging alliance of fundamentalist faith and globalized 
corporatism; and an urbancentric intellectual perspective that denies nature any spiritual presence 
capable of counteracting a triumphant industrialism.”).  Suffice it to say that a view of humanity as the 
authority or guardian of nature implies a capitalistic notion of nature as a force to be conquered and 
commodified. 
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by the whole Earth, the damage caused by an individual polluting a stream 
on her rural farm has far less potential to reverberate.   
To such a complaint, the analogy to shareholder derivative suits is 
apropos.  It does not matter if the shareholder has only one share, a tiny 
pecuniary interest in the corporation; her relationship to the entity is what 
gives her standing, not the magnitude of potential harm to her wallet. 
Furthermore, to assert that any harm to the environment does not necessarily 
harm the plaintiff is beyond the function of standing as a threshold inquiry 
and comes too close to the merits.  The proper inquiry for standing purposes 
is not how severe the damage to the plaintiff is but whether the plaintiff has 
a legitimate interest in the subject of litigation, which was harmed because 
of the defendant’s behavior.   
Finding that a plaintiff has standing does not mean that the plaintiff 
prevails in a lawsuit; it simply means that the case can be heard.  Under the 
law, humans have the right to harm the Earth to some extent.  Without such 
allowances, industry and agriculture could not take place.  But when a 
human has harmed or will harm the Earth in a way that is not lawful, such 
as when their business operations have polluted beyond the regulatory 
standards, one should not have to be immediately proximate to the violation 
just to adjudicate the claim.   
In fact, expanding the pool of potential plaintiffs may allow for superior 
accountability than reliance on private property owners or others with 
personal ties to a certain area to sue.  As Professor Stone pointed out, the 
cost of litigation for plaintiffs downstream from a polluter is often so much 
greater than the individual’s damage that the individual is not incentivized 
to sue for violations even if the aggregate damage of several downstream 
parties is significant and the harm to the local ecosystem is severe.125  Gaia 
standing would allow well-funded organizations such as the Sierra Club or 
Friends of the Earth to sue for such violations under the citizen-suit 
provisions of environmental statutes because members of such 
organizations are, like all human beings, parts of Gaia. 
Another critique, applicable to both Professor Stone’s thesis and Gaia 
standing, is that there would be some difficulty in determining what Gaia 
“wants” or is in Gaia’s best interest.126  Unlike a corporate officer’s 
 
125.  See Stone, supra note 55, at 459–60.  
126.  Id. at 471. 












fiduciary duty to shareholders to act in the best financial interest of the 
corporation, the responsibility that a Gaia-standing plaintiff has to the 
“Gaian corporation” is not immediately obvious.  However, as Professor 
Stone wrote, 
[N]atural objects can communicate their wants (needs) to 
us, and in ways that are not terribly ambiguous. I am sure I 
can judge with more certainty and meaningfulness whether 
and when my lawn wants (needs) water, than the Attorney 
General can judge whether and when the United States 
wants (needs) to take an appeal from an adverse judgment 
by a lower court.127 
To this point I will add that, for example, personal-injury plaintiffs are 
not required to have advanced medical degrees or even completely 
understand their injuries with precision when bringing a suit.  They are 
permitted to rely on expert testimony and doctors’ notes to establish harm.  
Likewise, a Gaia-standing plaintiff can employ the talents of an ecologist or 
even a Stanford-trained Earth system scientist128 to offer clues as to an 
appropriate remedy. 
Shareholders with even a minuscule pecuniary interest in a corporation 
are welcomed into court to litigate their claims, but the interest of parties in 
environmental litigation is far more extreme.  Gaia provides a framework 
for viewing the Earth as a single living entity, and serious injury to a part of 
it can lead to judicially cognizable injury to the whole of it.  Gaia standing 
would bring an end to the specious parsing of the injury requirement to deny 
standing to environmental advocates.  
Standing doctrine reflects choices made by judges who wrote opinions 
without incorporating what science teaches about Earth as an 
interconnected, completely indivisible biological system.129  Despite what 
the Court has held concerning injury-in-fact, the injury exacted on the 
biosphere by land abuse and industrial activity may prove to be not only 
concrete, but fatal, at least so far as humanity is concerned.130 
 
127.  Id.  
128.  See supra note 93. 
129.  See Ellinghausen, supra note 54, at 478 (“Scalia pointedly refuted the foundational 
environmental concept of interconnectedness, in which all elements of a natural region ‘are ecologically 
interrelated such that harm to any of that area injures all of it.’” (citations omitted)).   
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That courts may someday hear cases brought by plaintiffs under a 
theory of Gaia standing seems at the moment unlikely or even impossible, 
but it is not.  Courts have changed course regarding standing many times 
before, sometimes drastically, shifting to allow standing for people that had 
previously been categorically denied it, such as children, married women, 
and Chinese people.131  Gaia standing may be novel, but it is at least based 
on an empirical understanding of reality, unlike the current formulation 
which was simply made up.  Already we see that courts can be open to the 
idea of litigating broad environmental interests. For example, the court in 
the Juliana case found standing where plaintiffs “allege[] that defendants’ 
actions and inactions . . . have so profoundly damaged our home planet that 
they threaten plaintiffs’ fundamental constitutional rights to life and 
liberty.”132 
Lynn Margulis, lamenting the reluctance of some scientists to engage 
her now widely accepted theory of symbiogenesis giving rise to eukaryotic 
cells, said, “The only way behavior changes in science is that certain people 
die and differently behaving people take their places.”133  Perhaps the same 
can be said of law, but it need not be so.  Judges are free to learn new 
information and take up new arguments and adjust their approach to account 
for improvements in their own understanding.   
Humanity must make drastic changes in the way we as a species and 
society relate to the natural world before it becomes our undoing.134  As 
Margulis teased, “Gaia is a tough bitch—a system that has worked for over 
three billion years without people. This planet's surface and its atmosphere 
and environment will continue to evolve long after people and prejudice are 
gone.”135  Our federal courts must become sensitive to the broad but 
concrete injuries brought to humanity by environmental harms and deal with 
them accordingly.  There is no time left to do otherwise.   
 
131.  See Stone, supra note 55, at 451, 453–57.   
132.  Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1261 (D. Or. 2016).   
133.  See Margulis, supra note 86. 
134.  See Irfan, supra note 110 (discussing the U.N. report on global warming).  
135.  Margulis, supra note 86. 
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